Software 2000/Software 2000 Volume 1 (Disc 1 of 2).iso/utilities/u090.dms/u090.adf/Theory1

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Artificial Intelligence Theory Journal, Part One of Three

(1972-1977)

Standard Technical Report Number:  MENTIFEX/AI-1

by Arthur T. Murray
   Mentifex Systems
   Post Office Box 31326
   Seattle, WA 98103-1326 USA

(Not copyrighted; please distribute freely.)


                    Threshold Parameters of Consciousness        25 NOV 1972

     It should  be possible to ascertain what minimum requirements there are
for intelligent consciousness.   In dealing  with minima,  however, a strict
definition  or  detectability  of  intelligent  consciousness  may  be  all-
important.  Until we see exactly how strict  a definition  is necessary, let
us have  the use of language as our general criterion of the likely presence
of intelligent consciousness.
     We  can  list  what  in  present  theory  are  the  various  functional
mechanisms of  consciousness.  These include an input-sensorium, memory, and
motor-output.    In  Nolarbeit  theory  the  most  important   mechanism  of
consciousness is  the memory.  One might say that an external world to exist
in is also a necessity for  consciousness.    These  four  items,  then, are
required:
          1.  an environment
          2.  an input-sensorium
          3.  a memory
          4.  a motor-output.
     In each  of these four realms there can be variations as to quality and
quantity.  There can also be qualitative and quantitative relationships from
one realm to another within the total system of consciousness.  For example,
the breadth of the input-sensorium might influence or  determine the breadth
of the memory.
     For  each  of  the  four  realms  we  can  consider characteristics and
variables.  For instance:
          I.  The environment realm.
               A.  How many of the four dimensions does it have?
               B.  How much order is in it?
               C.  How much disorder is in it?
               D.  What degrees of complexity are found in it?
               E.  How stable or predictable is it?

         II.  The input-sensorium.
               A.  How many senses are there?
               B.  How many discrete receptors are there for each sense?
               C.  With what speed and with what frequency do the senses
                   convey information?

        III.  The memory.
               A.  What physical mechanism retains the memory-traces?
               B.  What percentage or amount of information from sensory
                   input and from conscious activity is retained in memory?
               C.  Can the memory "hardware" be used more than once?
               D.  What, if any, are the limits in time or capacity  of the
                   memory?
               E.  What aspects of unity and order are present in the
                   memory?
               F.  Are there divisions of the memory, such as  "short-term
                   memory" and "long-term" memory"?
               G.  Can the memory be monitored or read out?


         IV.  The motor-output.
               A.  How substantial must the motor-output be for
                   consciousness to exist?
               B.  What forms of energy can or should the motor-output
                   employ?
               C.  Must the motor-output be attached to or take the form of
                   a single, consolidated physical unit, so as to support
                   an image of the existence of a unitary, localized being?
               D.  Must the motor output have its own compartment of memory
                   for activation?
               E.  Should the motor memory be only such that its effects
                   are readily   perceivable by the input-sensorium in
                   immediate feedback, perhaps to further the  "illusion" of
                   consciousness?
               F.  Can conscious thought be considered a part of the motor
                   system?
               G.  Even if motor output is or were necessary to attain
                   consciousness, is  continued motor-output necessary for
                   continued consciousness?

     In discussing  "Threshold  Parameters  of  Consciousness,"  we  want to
investigate various limitations and minima involved with consciousness.
     One question  to consider  is whether  or not  the medium or content of
consciousness is delimited by some few and simple aspects of the universe as
an environment.   Perhaps  we could think of these reality-aspects as having
to do with geometry and dimensions.  When we are conscious, we are conscious
of something.
     Another supporting  consideration is that a unitary system or locus, if
constantly affected, even generated, by streams of input and output, can not
be concerned with more than a few simultaneous concerns.
     Any remembered thought can be summoned by a single associative tag, and
even a thought expressed in language  is  a  serial  string  that  goes from
element to element.
     In the  case of intelligent consciousness, it may be that symbolism, in
the  form  of  words  and  language,  permits  the  manipulation  of  large,
complicated  blocks  of  information,  of  thoughts.  Nevertheless, when any
aggregate is dealt with, it will probably be  dealt with  a part  at a time.
(But we  must not  neglect to consider the idea of simultaneous processing.)
An aggregate can be dealt with as a  whole when  its constituent  parts have
been understood.
     When  an   aggregate  is   dealt  with   as  a   whole  in  intelligent
consciousness, it is likely that the  symbol of  both the  aggregate and the
object,  namely,  the  word,  is  used  as  a  platform of manipulation.  In
intelligent reasoning, it is  essential  to  have  bundles  of associational
tags.   A word with its coded structure provides an extremely economical way
of bundling the tags.
     In intelligent reasoning, it is clear that the consciousness leaves the
primitive domain  of geometry  and dimensions and by means of symbolic words
deals with classes, generalities, and the abstract.
     Perhaps intelligence requires a fifth realm, symbolism.
     All five human senses have a certain sameness in that they all transmit
their information  along nerves.   It is obvious that for each sense we have
very many more receptors  than are  required to  get just  basic information
through the  sense.  Yet it is obvious that one receptor does not constitute
a separate sense and that a million are more than enough.   Besides, when we
use a particular sense we concentrate on a rather narrow point.
     In   consciousness,   memory  traces   are   manipulated  by  means  of
associational tags.  Unitary tags are  used to  distinguish aggregates.   If
the tags  are disjunctive,  then there  must be  disjunctive elements in the
very perceptions that form the memory  traces.   If the  sensory perceptions
were all  the same,  then there  could be  no discrimination by means of the
tags.  But the perceptions do vary and are different.   Yet  the perceptions
have to  be classified  in an  ordered manner  if the tag system is to work.
Classification must be according to similarities  and differences.   But for
the mind  to make  a classification,  or a  distinction, or a comparison, it
must first seize upon some small, uncomplicated feature.   Now,  if we dealt
with the  senses of  sight or  touch, we could deal with shapes or patterns,
with straightness, curvedness, angularity, and so on.  If a being dealt with
just a  single point  in touch,  it would not be able to distinguish between
variations.  But sight is  a  more  refined  sense.    With  sight  the most
intricate  distinctions  and  recognitions  can  be made.  Even in sight one
point as a receptor allows no distinguishing.   If we  imagine a sight-sense
having  just  an  array  of  receptors  on  a field or screen, we can easily
calculate the number of different images that can appear on a screen  with a
given number of points:

        # of          # of different
        receptors:    images possible:
                 1       2 minus 1
                 2       4-1
                 3       8-1
                 4      16-1
                 5      32-1
                 6      64-1
                 7     128-1
                 8     256-1
                 9     512-1
                10    1024-1.

However, in  the physical universe we experience or encounter both order and
repetition.  As the  number of  receptors on  the field  of our hypothetical
sight-sense increases  from just  one, the number of possible configurations
increases exponentially.  Once there are  several, but  not many, receptors,
it becomes possible on the field to represent basic geometric things such as
points, lines and curves.  These geometric things can be classed.   They are
utterly simple,  because two points define a line, and three points define a
curve.   More complex  geometric things  are built  up of  points, lines and
curves.    Perhaps,  therefore,  in  looking  for  threshold  parameters  of
consciousness, we could say that an  automaton can  not become  conscious of
curvature without  having at  least three sight receptors, and probably more
for contrast.  There ought to be two delimiters, a  minimum number  for bare
possibility  and  a  larger  number  above  which  more  receptors  would be
unnecessary.  The lower number should be pretty exact and  the larger number
should be rather indefinite, because functional success of classification or
recognition in between the two numbers will probably be statistical.  With a
more or  less certain number of receptors a classification becomes possible,
and then with increasing numbers of  receptacles the  classification becomes
more and more likely, until the likelihood cannot be increased further.
     We can  use these  basic geometric  things to  examine the mechanism of
consciousness.    We  postulate  that  memory   traces  of   perception  are
continually being  deposited.   The question  now is  how an associative tag
connects to a memory trace.   (The  process  will  be  different  for simple
shapes and for symbols.)
     It may  be that an interplay of two senses is required to lay the first
tags.  Or it may  be  that  the  first  tags  are  laid  automatically  by a
mechanism incorporated "genetically" into the organism.
     The sense-interplay  idea runs  as follows.  Visually similar items are
likely to exhibit similarities also for touch or hearing.   But the organism
"mentally"  concentrates  on  one  area  of  one  sense.  Suppose there is a
standard tag connecting temporally  successive memory  traces of perception,
from one  moment to the next in time.  There would be a tag from each object
of mental concentration to the next, in a sort of chain.   Suppose that when
a visual point is sighted there is also a tactile sharpness felt.  Therefore
on sighting  visual points  a chain  of tags  that was  going through visual
memory would  move also  into tactile  memory.   A sort  of discontinuity or
differentiation would arise.  Suppose that there were  a sort  of harmony or
oscillation established  in the  mind in  question, such  that, in a certain
ration, memory traces entered the  mind  (from  within  itself) interspersed
with the  actual and  present-time incoming sense perceptions.  That is, the
mind would automatically and continually be experiencing two phenomena:  the
present and  the past.   From  the past  would be summoned whatever was most
readily available  given the  action of  the associative  tags.   Thus in an
incipient mind  the activated  memory traces would be very recent ones.  How
would the mind reach any older memory traces,  not the  ones just deposited?
It looks  as though there would have to be some mechanism which would notice
change from one image to the next.  Suppose the imagery in  the visual field
changes only  occasionally.  Suppose that a number of changes have occurred,
and one more change occurs.   Now,  that  mechanism  of  the  mind  which is
feeding in  old memory traces interspersed with the new perceptions does not
have to be limited to going back just one memory-trace or one frame.  It may
be that  the internal  memory mechanisms function much quicker or many times
quicker than the input-sensorium.  Thus each newly made (newly sensed) frame
could  quickly  be  compared  with  several  or many older frames.  When the
above-mentioned  additional  change  occurs,  its  present-time  frame could
automatically be  tag-linked to  another change  frame seven or eight frames
back in the merely temporal, merely successive chain of frames.  Therefore a
new tag  is attached  which keeps  the significant older frame from receding
into oblivion.  The mechanism doesn't have to work on change, either; it can
work on similarity, which still implies change.
     The consciousness model which has been developed so far today works, if
at all, because each newly incoming frame of  sensory data  is compared with
several or many older frames from memory storage.
     This  line  of  thought  touches  on  the idea of a force towards order
operating in the universe, and it  suggests that  a tabula-rasa  mind can be
self-organizing.   Of course,  the initial order in the mind in question is,
after a fashion, transferred from without.  In ordering itself,  the mind of
the automaton reflects the order which it encounters on the outside.
     In such  a model,  the important  mechanism is  that which compares and
differentiates.  There are a lot  of  intriguing  questions  involved.   For
instance,  does   the  self-organizing   or  self-ordering   mind  need  any
rudimentary order to start out with?  That is to  say, is  the self-ordering
process  self-starting,  or  does  it  have  to be primed?  In a biochemical
organism, it should be easy for a certain  rudimentary order  to be provided
genetically in the brain.
     In machine  hardware, it should be easy to set up an input channel that
compares new and old frames according to various simple criteria.  The fewer
criteria there are, the more we can say that the machine is non-programmed.
     There can  be various  pre-designed, automatic  mechanisms in the mind,
but still the content of the  mind will  be free  and non-programmed.   For
instance,  there   could  be  a  pre-designed  mechanism  of  attention  and
concentration, which normally might oscillate back and forth between present
perception  and  recall  of  memory-traces.   However, dynamic factors could
cause the attention to  swing  in  favor  of  the  external  world  over the
internal,  or  in  favor  of  a  fascinating  internal  line of thought over
external perception, or in favor of one external sense over another.
     The more functional, mechanistic differentiation there is in the mental
automaton,  the  more  capable  it  will  be  of processing and manipulating
complex data.  If there are several senses  at the  machine's disposal, then
one sense,  such as hearing, can be used extensively for processing symbols,
such as words.
     A basic idea for the mechanism that compares and distinguishes with old
and new  data arrays  is that it should have something to do with elementary
phenomena of order in the universe.  For instance, in the case  of sight the
elementary  geometric   patterns  should   be  important.     Perhaps  "pre-
programming" or "quasi-genetic  endowment"  will  give  the  machine initial
capabilities with  regard to elementary phenomena of order.  In hearing, the
elementary phenomena  might  involve  frequencies.    In  touch,  they might
involve texture, geometric patterns or pain.
     Of  course,  there  is  a  certain order already present because of the
physical layout of the receptors of each sense.   An  optical retina  has an
array of  receptors, and  so does the human skin with its tactile receptors.
Obviously the order of the retina of the eye has to remain stable for stable
vision.   It is  highly unlikely  that such a high degree of order as in the
retina or the visual  system can  have been  provided genetically.   No, the
order of  vision must have been developed in the course of experience.  This
ordering may be, however, a function of growth  and development  rather than
of memory.


                                                                 15 JAN 1973

                     Developments on "Threshold Parameters"

     In evolution,  the probable order of appearance of the four realms was:
1. environment, 2. input-sensorium, 3. motor-output  (perhaps simultaneously
with input-sensorium),  and 4.  memory.   We may  be able to build our model
according to evolutionary lines, maybe not.
     Memory is the essential ingredient for intelligent consciousness.  This
condition  probably  also  applies  to  the  motor  system of an intelligent
consciousness, that is, if  we do  not supply  a memory-bound  mechanism for
motor control, perhaps we then cannot achieve any freedom of action and only
brute-like stimulus-response phenomena will occur.
     Transitory stages.  In setting up our model,  among our  componentry we
may have  to include transitory and initiatory stages.  The item in mind now
is a random dynamics mechanism which would initiate activity of  the "motor-
output"  so  as  to  start  a  circular  chain of information flowing.  (The
process should be like  that of  an infant  lying in  its crib  and randomly
waving its arms.)


                                                                 24 JAN 1973

                         Minimal Thinking Systems

     To  devise  a  minimal  automaton  that  functions  like a brain, if we
progressively reduce the number  of elements  that we  would deem necessary,
starting with  the totality  of elements  in a  conventional brain, we might
arrive at simple submechanisms  beyond  which  we  could  reduce  no further
without losing the nature of a brain.
     An idea:   We  can give  the machine  the capability  of changing every
aspect of its own structure and organization.  This idea can be  carried out
to varying  degrees.   The idea  would allow certain advantageous phenomena.
For instance, consider the notion of  self-organizing.    We  might  let the
machine  develop  new  ways  to  process  its  incoming information.  No old
process would have to be dismantled; it would just fall into disuse.
     So far we have enumerated such features of the automaton as:
          - input sensorium
          - memory
          - bouleumatic accumulator
          - random dynamics mechanism
          - motor output.


                                                                 23 JUL 1973

                        Psychological Insubstantiality

     The question  is,  how  much  being  must  there  be  for  a volitional
intelligence to  exist?  The amazing thing is that this is not a question of
mass  or  substance  but  of  particularistic  numerosity.    A  rudimentary
intellect will consist of a minimum number of active switching elements.  It
will not especially matter  of what  substance these  switching elements are
constructed,  but  rather  it  will  matter  only that they do perform their
switching  function  properly  and   reliably.      Ontologically  speaking,
therefore, their  nature will  be only  such as to hold, transmit, or change
information.  Substantially they may be quite chimerical and intangible.
     Assuming that the processes of intellect  are rather  simple, it should
take rather few switching elements to perform the basic processes.
     Importantly,  the  minimum  required  size of an aggregate of switching
elements  involved  in  intellectual   processes  will   probably  be  quite
independent  of  the  numerosity-size  of  the various sensory channels also
involved in the intellectual processes.   That is,  the size  of the sensory
channels will probably happen to be much, much larger.
     It is  theorized, anyway,  that the  intellectual processes function by
reducing to simplicity large, complex, or unorderly phenomena.   Large-sized
sensory  channels  may  be  necessary  to initially grasp the phenomena, but
their simple "handles," their  intellectual "distillates,"  should be simply
manipulable.
     Granted  or  assumed  then  that  there  is  a  small core of switching
elements necessary for the  existence  of  volitional  intelligence,  we can
elaborate   its   description   without   either   violating   its  lack  of
substantiality or contradicting the  supposition  of  its  numerically small
core.   We must elaborate its description to allow it a real-time historical
role in the universe.    Certain  mechanisms,  either  of  the  intellect or
attached to the intellect, must be capable of great extension with regard to
numerosity.    Among  these  mechanisms  would  be  such  things  as memory,
volitional motor  mechanisms, and  perhaps bouleumatic accumulators.  We can
conceive of memory in  artificial  intelligence  as  an  item  which  can be
expanded or  even contracted  to almost  any desired  extent.  Memory can be
expanded to increase the tempo of life or the longevity of the  organism, or
perhaps to  widen the various sensory channels.  At any rate, memory is that
of which is built the interior cosmos of the organism.
     An intelligent organism with full and  particular knowledge  of its own
make-up could  examine its  own memory  stores and consciously liquidate any
portions which seemed  unnecessary  or  undesirable,  perhaps  just  to save
space.
     In the above description of a volitional intellect, the central idea is
that the intellect can probably be  quite minimal,  that is,  both simple in
design  and  small  in  the  numerosity of its intellect-essential switching
elements.
     Note:  The above described intellect may seem to be too static, in that
all it  seems to  do is both to process whatever information is available to
it and to volitionally  effect  actions  necessary  for  its  well-being and
survival.    However,  such  an  intellect can never become static until its
whole universe becomes static.


                                                                 27 JUN 1974

                         The Book of the Nolarbeit

     The freedom to build a  language-computer  is  now  greater  than ever.
However, the  project involves  effort in several directions.  This notebook
is to be the central log of the project (Nolarbeit) this summer,  although I
feel free to stray from this notebook at any time.
     The  state  of  the  project  is  that  theory  and knowledge have been
accumulated, plus some money in the  sum of  two to  three thousand dollars,
and this summer is more or less free until September, and so now it is hoped
to begin working on some hardware.   Since  I  will  be  working  in several
varying directions,  I want  to follow  a documentary regimen in order to be
able on the one hand to record progress  on all  the subprojects  and on the
other hand  to leave  off a  subproject for a while and then return to it at
its furthest point of progress.  Budding ideas should be recorded here, too.
     I feel that my first step will probably be to collect and  read through
my accumulated  theory.   Then I  will probably rough out a general model of
what I want to build or construct with hardware.   One problem  here is that
the theoretical  concerns are  right down close to the engineering concerns.
However,  the  philosophy  and  theory  can  be  put  through  a  process of
stricture,  and  the  practical  engineering  can be governed by a policy of
keeping things as general, as standard, and as expandable as possible.
     (Later, around 11 p.m.)  I've gotten an  idea from  what I  am doing as
almost the  first step  in the active pursuit of this project.  That step is
that I am preparing a list  of what  I call  "Suggested Items  for Nolarbeit
Folder File."   Already  I have  made a  second, enlarged version of today's
first list.  My aim has  been just  to set  up a  file box  to sort  out the
various  items  of  information  collected  or generated.  I discovered that
doing so is just like setting  up my  file box  for teaching  languages this
past year,  except that  the subjects included in this Nolarbeit file really
range far and wide.  But now I see here sort of a general tool of inquiry in
this process  of establishing  the informational categories for my research.
The tool or technique is to  take  a  problem,  state  it  in  general terms
(implicitly or  explicitly), and  then divide  the problem  up into specific
subdivisions to be worked on.  After all, a problem  is like  a positive but
incomplete complex.   It  may be incomplete in one of at least the following
three  ways:    something   is  missing,   something  is   damaged,  or  the
infrastructure is  not understood.  Somehow I get the feeling that this line
of thought is connected with what is in the book on abductive  logic which I
bought today  on Norm's  advice at the U.W. Bookstore.  However, I have only
looked briefly at a few things in that book, I haven't read it yet.   At any
rate, there  is a  certain intellectual  process at  work here.  The general
problem "language-computer" does not automatically  yield  a  list  of fifty
subdivisions of  the problem.   No,  I had  to start writing down one by one
things that came to mind as probably applicable to the general problem.


                                                                 29 JUN 1974

               Suggested Index for Nolarbeit Folder File

Applications (Future)              Instinct
Archive                            Intellect
Attention                          Intelligence
Automata                           Learning
Bibliography                       Linguistics
Biology                            Logic Circuitry
Brain, Human                       Logic Philosophy
Brain, Nonhuman                    Logic Symbols
Clippings                          Mathematics
Coding                             Mechanics
Components                         Memory Technology
Consciousness                      Memory Theory
Control over Machines              Neurology
Correspondence                     Pain and Pleasure
Cost Analysis                      Parapsychology
Dreaming                           People of Note
Ego                                Perception
Electronics                        Philosophy
Embryology                         Pictures
Emotion                            Plans
Engram                             Problems
Entropy                            Problem-Solving
Environment                        Psychology
Evolution                          Randomness
Experiments                        Recursion Theory
Feedback                           Redundancy
Flowcharting                       Robotics
Freedom                            Security
Game Theory                        Semantics
Genetics                           Serial and Parallel Processes
Geometry                           Servomechanism
Hardware                           Supply Sources
Heuristics                         Switching Theory
Holography                         Terminology
Hypnotism                          Time
Index                              Tools
Input/Output                       Volition


                    Evolution of Central Nervous Systems

     Reading again the paper "Threshold Parameters of Consciousness" from 25
NOV 1972,  I can  see the possibility of a CNS developing by evolution.  The
paper says that four things are necessary for consciousness:
          1.  an environment
          2.  an input-sensorium
          3.  a memory
          4.  a motor-output.
The inputs and outputs seem to be a  buffer between  environment and memory.
Well, we  can think  of memory  developing first  in evolution.  If any cell
developed which gave a consistent response to a  certain stimulus,  then the
ability to give that response constitutes a kind of quasi-mechanical memory.
Of course, probably  any  cell  that  developed  also  responded  to certain
stimuli.   However, probably cells became differentiated in their responses.
Maybe  cells  developed  with   the  main   purpose  of   just  transmitting
information.   For instance, it is easy to imagine a simple animal where one
(muscle)  kind  of  cell  serves  mainly  to  cause  locomotion  and another
(neuronal) kind of cell serves mainly to react to an external stimulus by in
turn stimulating one or  more  muscle-cells  for  locomotion.    I  can even
imagine a neuron-type cell that both stimulates nearby muscle cells and also
inhibits muscle cells on the other side of the body lest they oppose motion.
     Where the motion of a simple animal has to be performed rhythmically, I
can imagine  a network  of neuronal cells developing to control the rhythmic
motion.  The control cells would  exhibit the  same rhythm  within their own
network.
     I can  imagine networks  of cells developing, where the network of each
specimen has to be trained by experience, for example, as in the learning of
a bird to fly.

     In trying  to simplify  the problem of designing the language computer,
we notice concern in the literature about the processes and the organization
of perception.  Visual perception presents us with enormous complexity.
     I am  concerned here  with at least two questions:  how much complexity
in perception can be done  away  with,  and  how  much  basic  complexity is
necessary to produce an intelligent mind?
     Perhaps  too  much  by  just  gut  feeling,  I suspect that geometry is
involved here.  By geometry I mean those simplest patterns  and connections,
such as  point, line,  circle, angle  and so  forth.   The numbers three and
seven figure here, because three is so elemental, and yet with three you can
distinguish between seven different units.
     You get the feeling that you can do a lot of slashing and paring of the
problem when you reflect that  all  the  rigmarole  involved  with  sight is
dispensable.   A human  being can  be blind  from birth  and still be highly
intelligent and just as positively conscious as a person with sight.  So I'm
not scared  when I encounter these complexities with pattern-recognition and
special processing involving the retina and the optic  nerve.   I think that
the major facet in a language computer is going to correspond to hearing and
speaking.  I almost get the  feeling now  that I  would be  providing enough
non-auditory  perception  if  I  just  made a simple robot consisting of two
touch-perceptive hands mounted by arms to  a  nondescript  body  on  a small
platform moving by electrically driven wheels or pushing/feeling feet over a
floor.
     Whatever the situation with modalities of perception is,  I get another
feeling, this  time to the effect that maybe there is an ultra-basic, simple
core to our conscious or intelligent systems.  This notion  has something to
do with  the idea  of comparison.   We  already assume  about a hypothetical
system that we can grant it unlimited memory capacity.   We can  endeavor to
grant it  all of  the five  perception modalities that humans have, and with
the unlimited memory storage the whole  panorama of  the system's perception
over time can be stored up.
     [An idea  that crops  up here  is:   how about  also granting unlimited
associative capability?  The intriguing  idea  here  is  that  the unlimited
associative capability is conceptually very simple.  We don't at all have to
be content with the few tail-end bits of a byte of information.  Why,  in an
artificial  mind  you  could  even  have  a machine that searched around and
connected pieces of information that hadn't been so originally but look like
they ought  to be  connected.   (For all we know, maybe the human brain does
have a function that does just that, perhaps during dreams in sleep.)]
     Yet total storage and total association do not  yet do  the trick.   It
means  nothing  if  pieces  of  information  just shift around in meandering
streams within a system.  This rationale leads, I suppose, to an idea that a
measure of  internal operation is going to have to be the production of some
kind of motor happening.   [The  outward communication  of internal abstract
thought might qualify as a measure of highly advanced internal operation.]
     When  we  consider  the  production  of motor happenings, it seems that
there is going to have to be an elaborate, practiced, well-known, associated
internal motor  system, so  that inside the machine there will be not only a
picture of the outside world but  also a  sort of  trigger-finger picture of
all  the  motor  things  that  can  be  done to the outside world.  Both are
learned pictures.  The perception picture  encompasses both  the outside and
the inner  world, and  maybe so  does the  motor picture,  in that we can do
things like play music to ourselves in our minds.
     I get a feeling that the  only reason  why a  human brain  can function
intelligently  at  all  is  because  the  physical  (and  maybe the logical)
universe seems to come together somehow into that small but manageable group
of three  (or seven) elements.  I get a feeling as though a brain (mind) can
really deal with only three to seven elements, but by  means of substitution
or capitulation a brain deals with fantastically complex things by a sort of
proxy.
     [An image suggests itself here of ten or more men all on stilts and all
the men  one above  the other  up into  the sky,  so that  the top man moves
around only as all the other men perform the same movement beneath him.  The
man at the top might then sort of represent a broad amalgam.]
     Imagine a  mind-cathedra of  seven elements (or three, however it turns
out to be needed).   No,  let's say  three elements.   These  three elements
really represent utter simplicity.
     Supporting  these  three  elements  there  could be analytical pyramids
which lend structure and significance to anything occupying one of the three
elemental positions.   For example, linguistic pyramids could be built up to
handle subject, verb and direct object.  This  triad is  about as  complex a
view of the external world as we perceive anyway.  We generally perceive the
external world in terms of one thing moving or causing  another thing.   The
complexity beneath  the "tip  of the iceberg" doesn't matter.  You might say
that all the underlying phenomena or  attributes  just  sort  of  "go along"
subconsciously, meaning that we are somehow quasi-conscious of things beyond
the three elements, below the surface of our consciousness.
     To achieve some completeness now by  also dealing  with spatial things,
we can  see that the three elements cover a lot of geometry.  If the machine
is supposed to be perceiving shapes, with three  main elements  it can adapt
to a line or a curve.  Suppose it is presented with, say, a pentagon.  Well,
then maybe it would just use the  three  elements  to  perceive  one  of the
angles.
     Two further  ideas to  discuss are  comparison and extension from three
unto seven.
     In dealing with a  system of  from three  to seven  elements, there are
several ways we can look at it.
     Suppose the  system consisted  as follows.   There  are seven elements.
Three are operational, and the other four are like reserve.
     We might say that  the three  elements are  points of  attention.  From
each triadic  element association  can dart  down and up within the pyramid,
but  there  could  be  a  function  whereby  the  three  elemental positions
obligatorily had to be in either constant or oscillating mutual association.
Thus the contents by single associative  tag  could  vary  within  a triadic
elemental position  from one  moment to the next, but the association of one
position to the other two would be unbroken.
     The whole concept of ego could occupy one  triadic pyramid,  a semantic
verb another pyramid, and a semantic object the third pyramid.
     Obviously, some  verbs (e.g.  "anticipate"?, "congratulate"?) have such
complicated (yet unitary) meaning that the whole meaning  can't possibly all
at once  be at  the unitary  focal point of consciousness.  If we expand the
conscious focal point to encompass some  complicated semantic  meaning, then
the  focal  point  can  no  longer  be  incisive  or  directed  or unitarily
manipulable.  So it  would seem  that each  Gestalt has  to be  present as a
pre-processed unit.
     The idea  here is  that maybe  intellectual comprehension can only take
place at a few cardinal hinge-points.   If  you don't  hinge a  Gestalt on a
maximum of three points, then maybe it just can't be processed.
     But what  does processing  amount to?  It would seem that production of
any old  motor  happening  is  not  enough.    Plain  unintelligent instinct
suffices  to  link  up  a  stimulus  with  a motor happening.  No, I get the
feeling that there is some sort  of comparison  process of  a logical nature
lying as a basic fundament to the operation of intellect.
     A comparison  mechanism could  work with seven elements.  The procedure
could be such that if you  get three  and three  positions filled,  then the
seventh  position  also  gets  filled  and  the  machine  acts upon whatever
associative tag fills the seventh position.  It could be or become  built in
to the  nature of  the seventh  pyramidal position  that its filling carries
along with it a sense that a positive comparison has been made.
     For comparisons of Gestalten involving less than three  pyramids, there
could be  comparison in sequence, so that the first pyramid is compared with
the fourth pyramid, and so on.
     If an action of comparison does not indicate  sameness, then  maybe the
associative course  of the machine would veer off along a tag filling one of
the positions where there was a  discrepancy with  a corresponding position.
Indeed, maybe  it stands  to reason that the course would have to veer along
that one of the two positions which  did  have  a  tag  filling  it, because
discrepancy would  mean that  only one  out of  a pair of positions would be
occupied.
     There may arise a  question  as  to  how  the  machine  is  supposed to
distinguish between  an action  of comparison and just random filling of the
six elemental positions.  It could be that the seventh position would play a
role  in  the  establishing  of  a  comparison  action.    Remember, various
processes (evolution, trial-and-error, conscious design) permit  there to be
almost any  sort of  complicated neuronal  system backing  up any one of the
seven elemental pyramidal positions.  We are conceptually  dealing here with
the  building-blocks  of  logic,  nature,  and  language.  A system that can
compare groups of zero to three units is a pretty high-powered system.  If a
system of  seven would permit conscious intelligence, then that system could
consciously compare groups of more than three units.   We  seem to encounter
here a  shade of recursion theory.  If we can produce conscious intelligence
by dealing with a small number of
                                                               [30 JUN 1974]
elements, then by a bootstrap operation  our product  takes over  for larger
numbers of elements.
     By evolution  and embryology, a brain could grow to a point where there
were myriad aggregates ready to perform the basic  function of intelligence.
Then,  once  one  aggregate  did  perform  the  function, a rapid organizing
process could make  the  rest  of  the  brain  subservient  to  the original
aggregate.
     Let us  assume that the machine mind conceptually starts out with seven
elemental positions.  Perhaps  these positions  can float  over neurons, but
the main  things about  them are that they are inter-associated and they can
compare one group of three units with another group of three units.


                                                                  1 JUL 1974

     Logic or logical operations may perhaps be accomplished  by a  brain in
two ways.  One way could be the elemental, fundamental way of comparison and
the other way could be a way simply of reference to logical material already
learned.


                                                                 20 JUL 1974

                         Small-Scale Function

     It would  be quite  easy to  build a device which recognized circles or
other tripunctual things.
     All recognition in a visual field  hinges on  a smattering  of cardinal
points, in  that small  area where  we always  look directly.  Our very wide
peripheral area is all just extra help; it does not comprise the essentials,
the sine qua non of sight.  I think that we have such a wide peripheral area
because we as organisms exist at  the center  of an  omnidirectional ball in
space.   Once we have rudimentary sight, which is also at the same time very
advanced sight, it is good  to  have  as  much  additional  visual  area for
peripheral  attention-getting  as  can  fit  on  an orb like the eye or on a
retina.     Motion-detection  and   attention-getting  can   be  done  quite
mechanically and  over probably  an unlimited area of visual perceptors.  So
we see here maybe three essential things:
          1.  Only a small central area is necessary for  intellect-coupled
              sight.
          2.  Sub-intellectual functions such as triggers and reflexes can
              be accomplished over almost any desired breadth or area.
          3.  Spatial concerns such as "the omnidirectional ball" will
              cause a sensory modality to fill up any available space.
This  foregoing  discussion  points  up  the probability of existence of two
tendencies in  brains which  tendencies probably  make for  very much larger
brains than  are necessary for intellect.  These two tendencies could be for
intellect-coupled perception and for reflex-coupled perception.   As opposed
to intellect-coupled  perception, we  can really  include reflex mechanisms,
involuntary mechanisms such as  breathing or  heartbeat, and  any mechanisms
which work because of instinct or genetic design.


                              Self-Organizing Systems

     In simulating a brain, we will probably have to make trade-offs between
experiential organization and genetically determined organization.
     A basic caveat to keep in mind is that an organized system  of probably
considerable complexity  can be brought about by genetics and evolution.  By
this caveat I mean that we had better not just  assume that  some complex or
far-reaching neuronal  mechanism is  too much to demand of a genetic origin.
I would say that any gross  function, however  complicated, can  probably be
achieved genetically.   However,  there are  certain functions which involve
the fidelity of processed perceptions, which  functions can  probably not be
managed genetically.
     Since gross  functions are so possible genetically, we therefore have a
form of  game-rule  authorization  to  employ  pre-programmed gross-function
mechanisms, however highly contrived, to facilitate self-organization in our
language-computer.  The  reason  that  the  mechanisms  might  be enormously
complex and  contrived is  that we might call upon them to do some fantastic
things.
     When you deal with neuronal mechanisms and switching  circuits, you are
really no longer dealing with material objects, but with pure logic.
     As recall  permits, I  would gradually  like to enumerate some of these
fantastic things which we could probably do with (to coin a word) autotactic
systems, with autotaxis.  One often-thought-of application involves memory.
     Suppose that  visual perception  went into  a channel of visual memory.
Suppose the visual image frames were pulsed into memory at  the rate  of ten
per  second.    Suppose  each  frame  consisted of a million yes-or-no dots.
Suppose that each  dot  were  memory-retained  by  a  single  neuronal unit,
meaning either  a neuron  or a  connective point between neurons.  By now we
have a choice in our design or simulation.   Will  the visual  channel, with
its  cross-sectional  area  of  a  million  bits,  be  laid  out  in advance
genetically  so  that  the  image-frames  just  fall  in  a  long  series of
prepositioned neuronal  units, or will the visual channel actually be formed
continually to receive data and in such a way that it grows  in length along
with the flow of data?

                                                                 21 JUL 1974

     Now  it  would  be  good  to  effect a joining of these two topics from
yesterday, "Small-Scale Function" and "Self-Organizing Systems."
     The first of two main ideas is that it seems quite likely  that all the
intellectual processes,  at the  height and  core of  their functioning, can
deal only with small-scale, simple material.   Accordingly,  if we encounter
large aggregates (such as the visual field or a whole-body tactile field) it
is likely that either  most of  the sense  is peripheral,  or highly complex
aggregates are  dealt with  perforce by  simplification (an  idea which will
force us to research parallel processing.)
     The second of the two main ideas is  that very  highly complex genetic-
type  mechanisms   can  be   used  to  further  the  above-mentioned  simple
intellectual processes.  An example might be an  attention-getting mechanism
that makes  the conscious  intellect attend to some specific tactile area of
the body, one hand or the other, for example.


                                                                 23 JUL 1974

               Possible Features of Language-Computer

  I.  Narrow Input Sensorium.
     A.  Sight.
     B.  Touch.
     C.  Hearing.

 II.  Comparison Ability.

III.  Memory Tending Away from Restriction.
     A.  Limited time span (but as though unlimited).
     B.  Perhaps self-organizing ability.
          1.  Ability to organize memory space for whatever data are
             perceived or generated.
          2.  Ability to construct and change associative tags.
               a.  Tags through comparison mechanism.
               b.  Tags through frequency of reference.

 IV.  Motor-Output.
     A.   A random stimulator of initial motor output (in pseudo-infancy) so
          that the machine can become aware of its motor capabilities.
     B.  Some gross pseudo-muscles.
          1.  For interaction with environment.
          2.  To engender sufficient variety of action  that simple language
              can be developed to describe the action.
     C.  Locomotion.
          1.  To impart a concept of identity or apartness from the
              environment.
          2.  To enhance language.
     D.  Communicative modality.
          1.  Perhaps pseudo-speech.
          2.  Perhaps direct transmission of internal code.
          3.  Probably communication in a form that feeds right back into
              the machine so that it can monitor its own communication.
     E.  Bouleumatic accumulators for conscious control of action.


                              Parallel Processing                23 JUL 1974

     Parallel processing might possibly be a key element in the construction
of a  language  computer.    Unlike  willy-nilly  reflex  activity, parallel
processing can  be a process with that sort of freedom which we require in a
conscious, intellectual mind.
     Parallel processing  would mean  that similar  or dissimilar activities
are going on doubly or multiply within a system.
     Parproc might pose difficulties with control and with system unity.  We
generally think of consciousness  as a  unitary activity  within a  brain or
mind.   Under parallel  processing, there might be multiple activities going
on, and yet only one of them would be the conscious activity.
     Problems  of  control  and  synchronization  might  arise  if  multiple
processes are coursing through the mind and some go faster, others slower.
     Anyway, there is a kernel of a problem here.  We are trying to get away
from unfree reflex or  instinctive action  and develop  free intellect.   At
present we  are trying to reduce both the initial and the basic processes of
intellect  to  processes  of  "small-scale  function"  as  envisioned  in an
elementary-logic  comparison   system.    Should  there  be  just  one  such
comparison system, or should  there be "beliebig" many,  so as to constitute
parallel processing?


                         Comparison Mechanisms

     More and more it seems as though the basis of any system of recognizing
and understanding will have to be some sort of comparison mechanism.
     Our contention here is that comparison has to be done on utterly simple
levels.  When any one broad mass of data is compared with another broad mass
of data, any judgment of similarity will have to be based on  an analysis of
each broad  mass into  simpler parts which can be compared with other simple
parts.  (See Arbib, "The Metaphorical Brain,"  1972, pp. 75-78.)
     If we want to attack this problem from one extreme, that of the utterly
simple,  we  will  deal  with  information  in switching theory.  If our two
comparand data masses could only have one bit  of information,  then, on the
one  hand,  comparison  would  be  simple,  because either both masses would
contain one bit and be identical, or not.  On the other hand, with masses of
only unitary  size in bits, there would be no possibility of less-than-total
differences.
     If we go further  now and  let each  comparand mass  have room  for two
bits,  then  there  can  be  identity  or  less-than-total differences.  For
example, each mass might contain one out of two possible  bits, and  yet the
order of their line-up might be experientially significant.
     (Idea:   We may  have two  eyes for  the purpose of initial comparisons
while we are babies.)
     If we let each comparand mass  have room  for three  bits, then  we are
still within  the realm of the absolutely comparable under simple logic, but
we have greatly increased the possibilities for less than total differences.
     Our amplified contention here  is that  with small  numbers of  bits we
have the  capability of  comparison that is reliable, simple, accurate, non-
exponential, and  so  on.    Small  groups  of  bits  can  be  compared both
abstractly  (unto  themselves)  and  with  experientially fixed reference to
order,  spatial  orientation,  and  probably  time-frequency   also.    This
immediately  previous   sentence  is  to  say  that  as  long  as  the  main
intellectual  process  is  free,  then  any  number  of   unfree  reflex  or
genetically  determined  processes  can  be  attached in support of the free
process.
     While it is obvious that comparison can be  done surely  and accurately
with small  groups of bits, it is also obvious that groups with thousands of
bits can be compared  only by  analyzing them  into small  groups capable of
comparison.
     (These considerations  probably apply  to visual  and tactile data, but
not to language data which are serially encoded.)
     Two questions arise here.
     First, how large  in  terms  of  groups  of  bits  should  the standard
comparison mechanism be?
     (Second, how will large groups be broken down?)
     To answer the first question, we now get into an intriguing area of the
self-organization theme.
     It is quite possible that there could be a standard  minimal comparison
mechanism with  self-expandable capacity.  Assuming that we are dealing with
the utterly basic geometric things,  then  the  standard  minimal comparator
could  be  based  on  a  certain  minimum  level.   If it then encountered a
somewhat simple aggregate which could  not  be  fitted  into  the comparison
framework, then  it might  automatically be possible to telescope or enlarge
the comparison framework up into a higher capacity.
     For example, this enlargement might be done to go from simple lines and
curves to  angles or ovals.  Part of the main idea is, though, that you only
get at a higher level by going through the standard minimum level.


                                                                 28 JUN 1975

                         Language and World Logic

     This evening I have been tabulating  the vocabulary  in a  textbook for
German One.   I  check each  word to  see if it is in Pfeffer's computerized
wordlist of the 737 most frequent German words.
     It is amazing how unnecessary each single one of these  737 words seems
to be  for the  general ability  to speak language.  I look at each frequent
word wondering just how much  this  word  will  help  a  student  to develop
fluency.  In each case I have to realize that the word will probably promote
fluency only to the extent that the student needs that word a  lot and finds
it there  in his mind when he needs it.  A word promotes fluency if it helps
to express ordinary experience and ordinary thought.
     Linguistic mentation  seems  to  hinge  not  upon  any  single  word of
vocabulary, but  just upon the presence of some few words and some few rules
of structure.  This  makes  it  seem  as  though  the  psychic  aggregate is
reducible to its parts and each part could perhaps stand alone.
     The number  of words  available doesn't really matter, because they are
just names to deal linguistically with things and actions.
     The number of rules need only correspond to the number of relationships
to be expressed.
     The amazing  thing about language is that within a mind it is so fluid.
Objects (or their representations) which are quite inert in the  outer world
can be manipulated effortlessly in the internal world.
     Pairs of  physical actions  which actions  could not themselves join to
produce an effect can  by  the  mediation  of  language  join  to  produce a
countless variety  of effects.  For example, a distant person can experience
by language both that a train is coming and that there is a cow stuck on the
track.   He can  then by  language and  radio cause the engineer to stop the
train or go to  a  siding.    At  any  rate,  physical  states  which cannot
themselves interact,  can, if idealized in language or logic, interact first
ideally and then physically as an outcome of the ideation.   Seen  that way,
language  becomes  a  sort  of  lysis  of the physical world into ideational
particles.  The names of things are an abstraction from them.   The rules of
grammar are an abstraction from the relationships between things.  If things
are named and relationships are perceived, then ACTION is potentiated either
in  the  ideational  world  alone  or  in  both the ideational world and the
physical world.  A mind could be thought of as the vehicle  of potentiation.
In a  mind, naming  and relationship-perception automatically give rise to a
flux of thought.  The thought does  not  come  from  nowhere,  but  from the
inherent logic  of the perceived situation.  We have here then not deduction
or  induction,  but  an   interplay  of   logical  quasi-forces.     A  mind
automatically mingles and synthesizes logical inputs in a sort of release of
logical tension.  Thus it is seen apparently that language  generates speech
or thought only in a dynamic continuum of constant assertion or readjustment
or operation of values held by the  mind.    Language  then  is  a  means of
mediating a  dynamic equilibrium among the propositions contained in logical
inputs.  The logic that language functions by  becomes a  logic of discovery
because the  logic synergizes  the possible  or probable relationships which
the input elements could  mutually enter  into.   Memory is  readily seen to
play a role here because the "possible relationships" are suggested forcibly
to the logic machinery  by  the  associative  memory.    When  the "possible
relationships" throw  themselves up to the mechanisms which embody the rules
of structure, those mechanisms  then  automatically  generate  statements of
concern to  the value-holding  mind.   All such new statements are linked to
the whole mosaic of previous mentation.  Statement  generation is  a process
in which things that are physically inert become logically fluid.
     What actual  activity is  there in such mentation?  The actual activity
is the re-assembling of the various associations in new relationships, or in
statements, which are expressions of relationships.
     Example:
          A.  As the Greyhound bus stops, I see the name of the town.
          B.  I remember that So-and-so lives in that town.
          C.  The notion is generated that I can visit or phone So-and-so.


                                                                 2 JULY 1975

                              Geometric Logic

     On 28  JUN 75  a treatise  on "Language  and World Logic" was expounded
which meant to show that structure rules in language are more important than
any  particular  vocabulary  items.    The  structure rules, however, are an
orderly reflection of the  same  order  (sequence,  causation, relationship,
etc.) which  exists in  the external  world.  The elements that fit into the
language structure rules make for very simple sets  with quite  few members.
For instance,  a very  typical sentence  would consist of a subject, a verb,
and a direct object - just three elements.
     It will probably  have  to  be  a  central  feature  of  any archetypal
language computer  that all the quasi-mental processes are based on and have
at their heart the  strictly  defined  manipulation  of  aggregates  no more
complex than the simple geometric items such as point, line, and circle.
     We might  say that  a neuronal  or switching-circuit mind can "primary-
process" only simple aggregates, although we do not  decide yet  what is the
maximum number  of possible  elements per  set -  three, or  maybe seven, or
beyond?  We can speculate quite a bit as to how many  elements a  mind could
primary-process; for  instance, maybe the prime numbers are involved in some
special way.  That is, maybe the process can handle  three elements  or four
elements, but  not five  or seven,  because they  are prime numbers.  But to
handle four might require a non-primary division.
     Of course, once there is a basic process such as geometric logic, it is
then easy  for a  mind to  operate recursively or exponentially.  That is, a
mind can operate with such speed and such pervasiveness that it may generate
the   deceptive   appearance   of   large   monolithic   operations.     The
pseudo-monolithic operation could really  be either  a great  number of very
rapid operations or a great number of parallel operations.
     Let's suppose  that there  were indeed  a mind  operating on a basis of
three-point logic.  This mind can perceive a set of three yes-or-no bits and
it "writes  down" each perceived set as an engram in permanent memory.  (The
present discussion "vel" rumination is going to be extremely simplistic, and
full of  digressions.)   The mind can perceive such tri-sets sequentially at
some rate, maybe around ten per second, but it doesn't matter.
     So far  we have  a mind  repeatedly testing  three reception-points and
then passing the data into a permanent memory.
     In a  previous year  we have  already done some work on how such a mind
might set up associations among data  coming in  and data  already stored in
the permanent  memory.   For the purposes of this present discussion we will
probably have to rework or regenerate  a  theory  of  how  association would
work.
     We can  now introduce to our model a tri-set of motor functions.  Let's
say that by activating any of  three motor  points respectively  it can move
forwards,  or  move  backwards,  or  revolve  clockwise.   We may or may not
elaborate now on the motor output, because in  past theory  it involved such
complicated features as "bouleumatic accumulators," but we should be mindful
of its likely existence.
     We can impute to  our mind-model  the ability  to perform  any strictly
defined, automatic  function or operation upon the data with which it deals,
incoming or stored.  This notion fits in quite well with the geometric logic
theory - in fact, it is the reason for the theory, because we want to reduce
elaborate mental operations to a fundament of utterly simple operations.
     It would be nice if we could devise a way for the  machine to  build up
inside itself  mechanisms more  complicated than  those with which it starts
out.  For instance, we are minimally going to have to postulate some sort of
association system,  with which  the machine is "born" as it were.  But that
means there are three or four sets involved with or  in the  machine:  input
sensorium;  association  network;  memory;  and  possibly motor output; plus
possibly a fifth "set" which would be the whole external  environment, which
could teach or "inform" the machine.  Our present "for-instance" is the idea
that these three or four  or  five  sets  could  perhaps  yield constructive
inputs of such a nature as to "transcomplicate" the association network, the
"Bearbeitungsnetz."
     Suppose that the permanent memory is a sequential path going  away from
the  "Netz,"  the  association  network.    We  might by "heredity" give the
machine the ability to lay down a secondary or tertiary memory path,  or any
number of them.
     Thus the  machine might have a secondary memory path which it would use
for the products of its internal functioning, its internal "reflection."  It
might have  a memory  path associated with the use of its motor output, even
in  such  a  way  as  to  constitute  a  true  but   versatile  "bouleumatic
accumulator."
     The main point right here is, however, that any additional memory path,
co-bonded to the mind by means  of  an  associative  network,  constitutes a
device for building up additional processing structures.
     We digress  here now  to discuss the methodology of how theory is built
up and enlarged from a pre-existing structure.
     Knowledge can generally be organized.  When we learn new knowledge in a
field, it  fits into a relationship of new knowledge to prior knowledge like
foliage to the branches of  a  tree.    When  we  are  just  theorizing, not
experimenting,  how  do  we  develop  new  knowledge  out of a seeming void?
Perhaps elements of the prior knowledge  suggest further  things, extensions
of the prior tendencies.
     A logical  structure is  extended by  a branching-out  process, but the
selection of the valid branches is  dependent upon  their valid re-alignment
with the  universe at-large.   A  prior structure  may suggest  all sorts of
extensions, but  the  valid  ones  are  the  ones  which  work.    The valid
extensions can  be found  by testing  the set of possibilities for valid re-
alignment with the universe at-large.   Thus even  in this  discussion it is
proper to  state many digressions in order to go back through them later for
either acceptance or discarding.
     A system operating under geometric  logic,  which  is  absolutely well-
defined, should  be especially  capable of  establishing valid extensions to
any structure which it holds.
     We may now digress to discuss the topic of how  the human  mind handles
such wide  sensory input  channels as sight, hearing, and touch.  These vast
channels can probably fit under the notion of geometric logic,  that is, the
perceptions can  probably be  ultimately based upon simple aggregates of the
order of geometric logic.  Synthesis and analysis both play roles here.   We
might say  that any  synthesis is  "superfurcated" over several analyses, or
that the analyses are "subfurcated" under a synthesis.
     When our mind beholds  a visual  scene, we  are conscious  of the whole
scene before  us at  once.  A skeptic to our theory might ask how we can see
the whole scene at once if  a neuronal  mind is  based upon  small geometric
aggregates.
     There are  several distinctions to be made.  Though we are conscious of
the whole scene, our attention always is focused on some  one point  or spot
in the  scene.  Our attention can dart about, but it is always unitary, just
as the human mind is considered to be unitary.
     Yet even while we  attend to  one spot,  our mind  is conscious  of the
whole scene.   It  seems that  here is  a case  for parallel or simultaneous
processing.  Every punctual  sight-receptor is  probably associated  in many
ways  with  constellations  of  past  experience  which  permit it to engage
constantly in a flurry of associative  activity while  the mind  beholds the
visual scene.   Therefore,  while the  mind is watching the scene, the whole
receptive "plate" is seething with neuronal  activity which  goes ad libitum
deep  into  subfurcated  structures.    Probably  there  is  even  a sort of
competition raging as to which spot of perception  will successfully agitate
for control  of the process of attention and for the focus of consciousness.
So even though there is a focus of consciousness, the total process can be a
vastly broad phenomenon.
     Still it  seems hard  to imagine  that one  can be conscious of so much
material all at once.  There  is a  certain deceptive  process, though.   We
attend fortuitously  to whatever we want, and our attention darts all about,
creating  perhaps  the  impression   of  simultaneous   rather  than  serial
perception.
     If we  define consciousness  (elsewhere) as a certain activity, then we
should consider the idea  that consciousness  actually "lives"  in the great
sea of  perception.  That is, consciousness creates itself partly out of its
own perceptions.  We might say that incoming visual perceptions do a sort of
flattening-out  of  our  consciousness.   We should remember that operations
flash many  times  per  second  in  our  mind,  so  that  our wide-channeled
consciousness can  very well  be just as much an illusion as the illusion of
motion created by  a  motion-picture  film.    It  is  further  important to
remember that  the very  wide channel of sight is altogether unnecessary for
the existence of consciousness.  Since we can be conscious  without any wide
perception channels at all, we can be encouraged in this work concerning the
"oligomeric" geometric level.

                                                                 3 JULY 1975

     Now we  can digress  upon "superfurcation."   If  a mind  can deal with
three points  absolutely at once, that is, absolutely simultaneously and not
just in succession, it can also have any number ad libitum of mechanisms for
doing the  tripunctual operations.   That is to say, the limitations of mind
must not be thought of as hardware limitations, but as logic limitations.
     A basic set of three points can have subfurcations under one or more of
the three points.  By association, an elemental point can really represent a
large subfurcated aggregate.
     We might consider the idea that  neuronal, or  switching, machinery can
work  both  horizontally  and  vertically.    We  might consider that normal
neuronoid  operation  upon  a  tripunctual  set  is  horizontal.    Then any
operation involving separate levels of furcation would be called "vertical."
     An associative  network would  probably be  free to disregard levels of
furcation.
     We might consider that logical manipulation of superfurcated aggregates
hinges upon salient features, made to seem salient by associative operation.
When three different things made salient rise to the tops of their furcation
pyramids,  then  perhaps  a  sentence  of  language  in  deep  structure  is
generated, with the three  different things  finding expression  as subject,
verb, and  direct object.   Each thing finds a name, and although a name can
be long, a name is still a unit.
     Perhaps in  an  advanced  (non-infantile)  mind  the  distinctions fade
between  levels  of  furcation,  and  there may be such boisterous neuronoid
activity that large aggregates such as long sentences seem to be treated all
at once  and as  a whole.   But  still the operations described by geometric
logic theory might be seen as precedent and  preconditional to  such massive
activity.
     Unhampered by  biologic genetics,  and returning to our model, we might
construct a machine with a capability of expansion  (or contraction)  of any
logic channel involved with it.
     We might  start out  with a  sensory channel  of three points, and then
enlarge it by any number of points, as  we see  how the  machine handles the
various channels  of various sizes.  Of course, by our furcation theory, any
input can be analyzed down to an oligomeric set governed by geometric logic.
But with  wider channels there can be a lot of automatic processing (or pre-
processing) and we can inaugurate a  sort of  attention-mechanism within our
model.  An attention-mechanism must probably be backed up by the whole gamut
of horizontal and vertical association networks, if not  actually consist of
them.
     Visualizing a  mind now as an oligomeric logic machine, we are ready to
make a comparison between wide input channels and extremely narrow channels.
To start with, regardless of the size of the input channels, a mind will try
to deal with large logical aggregates  which it  encounters in  the external
world.  A vast external aggregate is a given.
     Whenever  the  channel  is  not  large  enough  to  cover  the external
aggregate, then the mind must attack the aggregate in a  piece-meal fashion.
This might  mean reconstructing the aggregate in the mind after studying its
parts.  The process might be similar to the way we can  get to  know a whole
city without seeing it all at once.
     If  the  input  channel  is  wide  enough to take in the whole external
aggregate, then the mind has a certain advantage.   This  advantage might be
illuminated by  a theory of "telescoping" of the furcation levels.  That is,
with a wide channel of input, it may be possible  by organization  to select
out  purely  logical  features  irregardless  of  their physical dimensions.
Every flashing application of processing machinery can generate  one or more
associations.    The  association  network  can  climb up and down furcation
levels until the most salient features  of the  aggregate are distinguished.
The oligomeric  geometric logic  can still have operated here, because it is
built into all the mechanisms at work.
     The  amphidromic  association  network   allows  an   aggregate  to  be
understood at  whatever levels  it is  analyzed on.  The same network allows
abstraction by soaring up to the most generalized levels.
     We may now  digress  upon  those  common  optical  illusions  where our
perception  of  a  drawing  seems  to  fluctuate  back and forth between two
interpretations of the same drawing.  The fluctuation could easily be due to
oscillation  within  an  associational  network.    It  is the job of such a
network to  produce  a  "most-salient"  interpretation.    However,  for the
illusory  drawings  there  are  two  highly  "salient" interpretations.  The
oscillation could take place  because when  one "salient" result-association
is formed,  it tends to become unitary with respect to its relative power of
commanding associations, and so the other competing result-association, with
its  multiple  "threads,"  becomes  statistically  dominant, and so back and
forth.  If the associative "valence"  of an  achieved result-association did
not tend  to sink towards unity or whatever, then we might find it difficult
to ever remove our attention from a stimulus.

                           Scratch-Leaf                           3 JUL 1975

- superfurcation, subfurcation?
- All sense avenues just specializations of tripartitism.
- Geometric logic favors "unity of mind."
- input  channel-width of automatic expansion coupled with memory  channels
  of a width determined solely by the association network.


                                                                 4 July 1975

                         Self-Organizing Mechanisms

     At  this  stage  in  the  preparational  research,  it  is necessary to
consider three systems:
          1.  A system to analyze sensory input and do two things with it:
               A.  Associate it with information stored in memory.
               B.  Put it into memory in such a way that to it, too,
                   associations can be made from future input.
          2.  A way for the organism to build up internally analytic
              systems more complex than those it starts out with.
          3.  A way for the organism to use trial-and-error or the  process
              of elimination to accomplish number two above.


                                                                 5 JULY 1975

     The design  order or  request for #2 or #3 above (from yesterday) might
be just that the system has  to  build  up  an  internal  recognition system
capable of detecting the second (or higher) reception of a certain input set
of a certain complexity.
     In other words, the organism is  self-organizing in  an ever increasing
way.   It is  only spurred  on to develop increased recognitional capability
when it encounters a perception for which it does not yet have the ability.
     Obviously, such  a system  might have  to obey  the law  of "Natura non
facit  saltum."    That  is,  it  might  have  to  build  up its recognition
capability step-by-step, in such a  way  that  certain  complexities  can be
recognized (or compared or analyzed) only if the organism has by chance been
led up to them by means of intermediate complexities.


                                                                 6 JULY 1975

                  Scale of Input to Self-Enlarging Processor

     Information that comes into the mechanical  organism will  be processed
in a  way which  tries to  link up the new information with past experience.
Obviously, that link-up must be a  two-ended channeling,  in the  sense that
the  organism  must  be  able  both  to  direct  the  whither-goings  of new
information and it must have a way of specific access to any required stored
information.   Retrieval or  re-use of information is possible only if there
is a discriminatory channel of access to that specific information.
     I  see  two  ways  of  access  that  will  get  straight   to  specific
information.  One way would be to be able to find information by the code of
what the information actually is.  That is, information would be accessed by
the logic  of what  the information  actually is.  Geometric shapes could be
accessed that way, or  words of  a human  language.   The information itself
would be  the code to its "address."  This method might compare with what in
electronics is called "Content Addressable Memory."
     The second way of access would  be  access  by  means  of  an arbitrary
associative "tag."   It could be assigned because two things happened at the
same time, or because one closely followed another.   With  associative tags
it might  be good  to imagine a device which can automatically lay down tags
anywhere.
     One might say that  "code-access" is  more refined  or more manipulable
than "logic-access."  For example, words are more manipulable than pictures.
However, it may be true that raw input data are never perceived  directly as
code but must always be sorted out first according to logic.  That is, sight
or sound, I mean, light or sound, is basically a physical phenomenon,  not a
code one.   It  is cumbersome and unwieldy before it gets changed into code,
but afterwards it is very handy.  So we might  say, "Logic  comes first, and
code comes  second."   THe frontiers  of perception  are logical, and in the
heartland of the mind we use code.
     I think that the major sense  we must  tackle is  sight.   Sight can be
two- or  three-dimensional, but the other senses are rather lineal.  Through
sight we can garner a lot of information to work  with using  code.  Through
sight  we  can  know  objects  more  directly  and  we  can  observe  myriad
relationships.  The great think-tanks are working on pattern-recognition, so
obviously it is a field of much research.
     If we  work on  sight as  a major sense-channel, we can keep everything
simple and work with minimal parameters.   We  can get  to the  topic in the
above title, scale.
     For  sight  we  basically  need  a  two-dimensional  field  of punctual
receptors.   The  main  question  of  scale  is  how  many  points  we need.
According to  our theory  of "telescoping" from 3 JULY 1975, above a certain
unknown size a visual field just permits the  treatment of  greater physical
dimensions, not greater complexity.

            XXXXX     OOOOO               x x x x x
            XXXXX     OOOOO               x x x x x
            XXXXX     OOOOO               x x x x x
            XXXXX     OOOOO               x x x x x
            XXXXX     OOOOO               x x x x x

                  x x x x x       . . . . .
                  x x x x x       . . . . .
                  x x x x x       . . . . .
                  x x x x x       . . . . .
                  x x x x x       . . . . .

     Suppose our  model from  3 JULY  1975 had  a visual perception field of
twenty-five points as type-written above.   That field  would be  its window
upon the external world, and it could see shapes or figures that passed into
that field.
     According to our theorizing from 4 & 5 JULY 1975,  we might  be able to
add on peripheral points to that first visual field as we went along.
     Having a  25-field like this entails having a memory channel consisting
of many slices, each with at least twenty-five points.  Or does it?
     What can we say about this visual field?  First of all,  its activation
is  pulsed.    It  is  not  just  steadily transmitting the state of all its
receptors, but rather it sends individual pictures at the rate  of a certain
interval,  perhaps  every  tenth  of  a second, or whatever the experimenter
wants.  It is pulsed so that the  pictorial logic  of one  discreet point in
time does  not merge  with the logic of another time.  Of course, it doesn't
matter where the pulsing takes place, either at the sender or the receiver.
     Let's say that the utterly  middle  receptor  were  the  main  point of
visual perception.   Numbering from left to right and from top to bottom, we
can call it point thirteen.
     From point thirteen we might  begin  our  process  of  building  up the
internal perception  or logic  mechanisms.   Of course,  we want to supply a
minimum organization by "heredity," and then let the  machine carry  on from
there.
     If we  like, we  may let  the laying-down  of memory engrams occur only
when a significant internal logical function  transpires.   That is,  if the
machine achieves something in sorting out an input frame, then we could have
the machine record the result.  Of course,  if we  had a  constantly erasing
memory loop, then we might let just anything get engrammed.
     If we  can devise  our sought  way for the machine to construct its own
internal order. then we would not need to pre-order the  perception of, say,
three points, such as, say, numbers 12, 13, and 14.
     We have  to have  a field, a comparator, and a memory.  It is up to the
comparator to decide whether  any image,  total-frame or  part-frame, is the
same as  any image  in memory.   Only then can other associations enter into
play.
     A rather potent comparator could  consist  of  only  five  points, say,
numbers  8,  12,  13,  14,  and  18,  and  it  might look like the following
typewritten image:
                                          x
                                        x x x
                                          x

     Such a five-point comparator would  allow  the  detection  of  lines or
breaks in  lines along  four directions:   horizontally, vertically, and two
criss-cross directions (or orientations).  Examples are:

  x         o            o         x         x
x x o     x x o        o x x     x o x     x o x
  x         x            x         x         o


                                                                  7 AUG 1976

     - The seven points of geometric computation are the  bottleneck conduit
through which all ratiocination must pass at all levels.
     - One  facet  of  ratiocination  is  the  analysis of new data and then
comparison with reference data.  The ability to compare universally requires
the  breakdown  or  analysis  of  data  to that point where they are not yet
identical but where utterly simple features can be said to be or not be held
in common.
     Things  and  classes  of  things  must  lend  themselves  to "isologic"
comparison by a process of bringing  them within  the scope  or framework of
the simple  geometry.   It is assumed that, since things in the universe and
also ideas have parts, they are to be analyzed in terms of  their most basic
distinguishing features.   Perhaps  first they  must be  analyzed into their
most basic natures, such as whether they are a number,  an idea,  a shape, a
quality (such as greenness), or a physical thing.
     I guess  we are  trying to  say here  that things have differences, but
that by virtue  of  similarities  things  fit  into  classes,  and  that the
ultimately basic  classifications of  the universe  are not  great enough in
number to overload or swamp the simple geometric logic of ratiocination.
     If classes become large at non-basic levels, then a separate process in
ratiocination can count and keep track of their elements.
     Even if  there were  or are  more than  seven basic  facets of reality,
either extra ones could be ignored  or  else  a  bootstrapping  technique of
virtuality could accommodate them all.
     If we  construe ratiocination  as meeting  all things through a septet,
then we can start designing a minimal universe, because where all things are
reducible to septets they might as well be septets.


                                                                  8 AUG 1976










     Does a fixed-position eye mechanism add extra data?
     In a  comparator there  must be  a play-off, somewhere, among capacity,
speed, and specificity.
          -  It must function all in one step, not in a series of  steps, so
             that its comparison results are instantaneous.
          -  The greater  its capacity in numbers of elements, the more
             logical classes it can compare and process instantaneously.
          -  When the size of an array reaches a large enough number of
             elements, then  classifications cease to hold up with respect
             to exact configuration of elements.
    A comparator of a million elements is logically possible, we can imagine
it, but  it would be totally useless for classifying patterns of up to a
million elements, because it could not  cope  with  slight  variations.   So
somewhere a ratiocinator extracts pattern from a massive array.
     My main  thesis here  is that such extraction has got to occur by means
of an unmistakable comparator mechanism.  Although I say "unmistakable," the
search for  pattern can  certainly flit  about testing various alternatives,
but the final adoption would be a logical structure exact  in every element.
(Of course, an added mechanism could allow variations within a pattern.)  My
thesis is furthermore that with a very few elements a  comparator can handle
all basic  logical structures  and patterns, so a ratiocinator might as well
apply a simple  comparator  to  perform  basic  encounters,  to  classify or
"recognize" basic  patterns, and  then apply  the same  simple comparator to
cope with the finer  details and  distinguishing features  which lurk behind
the representative  features treated  as primal  elements in  the most basic
comparison made at first encounter.
     The above discussion seems to indicate that the  simple comparator must
indeed  be  able  to  cope  with  structures  or "patterns" in which certain
elements may  be  variable.    On  the  one  hand,  variation  must  show up
distinctions,  but  on  the  other  hand  variation must not nullify a valid
comparison ("recognition").
     When we set up a fundamental  comparator, we  must remember  that it is
like just a window to the world, and that it does not and must not limit the
degree  of  possible  logical  complexity  within  the  interior  processing
structures of  the ratiocinator.   That  complexity will be limited by other
factors, such as genetics.  The  comparator must  be viewed  as the absolute
conduit  of  information.    Even  if  there  are  wide  perception channels
peripheral to the organism, to the ratiocinator, nevertheless an unescapable
bridging  of  pure  logic  must  occur  between  the  outside  world and the
ratiocinator, and this bridging, since  it  is  the  source  of  all outside
information, really  lies at  the heart  of the  ratiocinative process.  One
could almost say that ratiocination, understanding, is an  instantaneous and
immediate  process,  and  that  extended  ratiocination  is just an extended
series of ratiocinative instants, none of which can  exceed the  "Umfang" or
scope of the basic window process.  Thus ratiocination is like an acid which
is simple in itself but which can eat away even the largest structures.
     Of course, a ratiocinator can have  such great  interior complexity and
such speed  of operation  that it becomes able to deal with massive internal
aggregates (such as an abstract noun) in a process of  virtuality, where an
aggregate,  after  meeting  certain  tests  (by associative tag), is quickly
subsumed under a single element or two so that it can participate  in a very
fundamental logical operation.  Of course, certain logical tags will keep an
elementalized aggregate from losing its  identity  during  operation,  but I
want  to  remind  that  logical  processing can occur only within the simple
comparator mechanism.  In contrast, there are no restrictions on associative
tags, which  may be imposed capriciously or arbitrarily from without and are
not in themselves  logical,  although  they  may  convey  a  logical content
("Inhalt") belonging to a "Gesamtbild."
     So far today, we have:
          - simple comparator
          - memory engram channel
          - tagging mechanism.
     Assuming that all input data are pulsed and laid down in memory, how do
the comparator and the tagging mechanism differentiate among the engrams and
make classifications of engrams, giving them quasi-addresses?
     It is  probably safe  to say that only what goes through the comparator
becomes an engram, because, remember, the comparator is the absolute conduit
of information.   When  an apparently broad slice of channel gets laid down,
really it is an  aggregate of  comparator-processed structures  laid down in
hierarchy.   It could very well be that associative tags are what intrude to
set up the hierarchy.  It  then follows  that associative  tags parallel the
inherent relationships between the primal elements of the fundamental simple
comparator.  The effect  is like  when you  blow through  a bubble  ring and
create a series of bubbles wafting through the air.
     The preceding paragraph is a breakthrough of sorts, because it suggests
that tags  are created  when a  slice of  data goes  through the comparator.
Now,  the  actual  physical  operating  of  a  tag-system  ("tagsyst"?) is a
function  of  the  dumb,  brute  internal  hardware  and  can  be completely
automatic, even  if cumbersome.   In  the work  of previous years, we almost
tried to force a vision of the tagsystem as arising spontaneously out of the
memory  system.    Even  if  the  tagsyst  does  arise  from the memsyst, in
maturation it has to be a quite discrete entity, an absolute mechanism which
can not  have its  nature or  organization changed by the data going through
it.  (Such a change might constitute hypnotism.)
     It is  doubtful  that  the  same  tagsyst  hardware  unit  can  be used
reiteratively to  process all  the distinguishing subsections of an incoming
aggregate,  and  so,  bingo!  you  have  "parallel  processing;"   that  is,
differentiation into  any one  exceptor screen  of a  tagsystem must lead on
into a whole series of tagsysts.
     Immediately  here   a  wide   variety  of   possibilities  emerges  for
consideration:
          - Is there clocking during parallel processing?
          - Can a  tagsyst handle a string of engrams, or must every engram
            contain a tagsyst?
          - Do tagsysts form automatically whenever novel data are
            experienced?
          - By a  process of virtuality, does the frontier of awareness grow
            broader and broader, so that a ratiocinator can feel
            consciously aware of a whole panorama at once?


                                                                  9 AUG 1976

     As of  yesterday, the  Nommulta work is going especially well, now that
we have moved into an area  (basic ratiocination)  where everything  that we
have been  theorizing has  remained of  a nature  easy to  produce in actual
hardware.  That is, as we move along in theory, we keep conscious of  how we
could build each physical device.  In previous years our work was obstructed
or came to a halt, when we would come to a point in theory where we could no
longer imagine  how to build an item.  Of course, there's an underlying idea
of whatever we can dream up, we can build.  Or perhaps we would reach points
where we  could build  the stuff,  but we couldn't see where it led to next.
For instance, we dreamed  up  the  "bouleumatic  accumulator"  with  all its
attendant  theory,  as  a  physical device for achieving conscious volition.
The "boulsyst" was a nice, intriguing  concept  all  in  itself,  because it
solved the  tantalizing problem  of how you could think of an action without
willy-nilly performing  that  action  with  your  muscles.    Hopefully, the
boulsyst solved  the problem by subvectoring each volition into two separate
memory approaches.  If you just think about an action, it won't  occur.  But
if you  simultaneously think  about the action and about willing the action,
it does occur.  The boulsyst  idea is  that, in  one of  the two approaches,
probably the  volition track, there is a sort of integrating or accumulating
function so that you  can begin  to think  volition while  sensing a trigger
level.   There is  not a  separate volition observing the trigger level, but
rather the whole consciousness stays busily  attuned to  the approaching act
of volition,  and so  you could say that the entire conscious mind causes an
act of will.  THere is choice because  the possibility  of an  action can be
considered at length in advance.  The nitty-gritty of the boulsyst theory is
that some memory tracks are actually causative of action, and that to summon
or activate  such a  track in  conjunction with an attained boulsyst trigger
level is to initiate an act of the motor system.
     Once we had the boulsyst, we  couldn't put  it to  work yet  because we
were still working on how to take data from a perception channel and process
them into a memory track.  Storage of data was not important if we could not
figure out  how to  organize data  and how  to let  them interact with other
data.  We began to think a lot  about associative  tags and  about a minimal
ratiocinative entity.   For  months and  months under our bourgeois cover we
contemplated the possible make-up of an absolutely simple,  yet intelligent,
mind.   If minds and universes have parts, then let's make the simplest mind
in the simplest universe, was the idea.   Now, perhaps  temporarily, we have
in  the  area  of  ratiocination  a  concept  which  leads  in many exciting
directions at once.  I go rather personally into such  tangential narrations
because this Nolarbeit is really a personal, unshared project (I can find no
collaborators) and all this writing serves the personal purpose of capturing
ideas in order somewhat laboriously to build a structure of ideas.  I really
rush to get certain things  down.    Ideally  I  might  write  while  a tape
recorder runs  so that  I can blurt things onto the tape before I forget the
wording that came to me.   This is  a personal,  hobby project,  but I would
like to  achieve some results that would get someone else interested in what
I'm doing.  Then they might  like to  read my  notebooks, but  even so  I am
continuing to  write what  to myself is clearest and feels most comfortable,
such as my slangy vocabulary and my concealing use of "we."  Then let no one
complain, because  right now this material isn't written for a second party.
I don't even have  to separate  the theoretical  from the  personal content,
because later  on I  can index  the content by date plus or minus paragraph.
To indulge further, the beauty of it is that I am generating a mass of ideas
in  an  utterly  free  process,  with  no constraints of deadline, money, or
practical purpose, and it is not a sand-castle situation, but rather a real-
life endeavor  because everything  is tied  in with the idea that the proper
study of man is man.   Furthermore, it  amazes me  that I  generate all this
glib verbiage with slang, termini technici, and neologisms year after year.
     At any  rate, basic  ratiocination is  leading in certain directions of
theory, and it is beginning to look as though soon we might be able to bring
together  and  combine  a  lot  of  separately  developed  subsystems.   For
instance, the bouleumatic system would be  a  major  part  of  any complete,
integrated model of a mind.  (It bothers me to put such words as "model of a
mind" into print, because they state so explicitly  what this  project is so
hubristically all about.)  After all, one of our ongoing research techniques
was to try to list all  the major  necessary components  of a  mind.   If we
devise  the  components  in  detail  one  by one, eventually we will reach a
finally problematic component, the solution to which becomes the solution to
the whole.
     I notice that I am delaying a bit before plunging on to pursue the idea
of basic ratiocination.  On the one hand, I suspect that the theory is going
to get pretty complicated now, and on the other hand I want to sort of stand
and look around where I am.
     I suspect that I may be putting forth a theory  for parallel processing
in a  mind.  Such an idea warns of getting into extreme complexity either in
theory or in hardware, but it also gives a feeling of success, because I was
not really aiming at parallel processing, although the idea always floats in
my mind as one of the  problems of  intellect.   Rather, I  was aiming  at a
single process  and by  its own  development it  took me  into the erstwhile
scary area of parallel processing.  I had been afraid of parallel processing
because it  never yielded  to any dwelling of thought on it.  I think I felt
that I would be able to figure out the individual  ratiocinative process but
not the  immensely broad  process that humans have in things such as vision.
Now my theorizing from yesterday suggests that there  is one  single way and
that there  is no distinction between individual and parallel ratiocination.
After all, didn't we always make a point in our theorizing of  the idea that
consciousness always  focusses on one thing or attends to one thing, but can
be distracted by many things?


                                                                 10 AUG 1976

     To see where I am, I want  to  list  what  I  consider  to  be  my main
developments in the whole project since 1965 or 1958:
          - pulsed memory track
          - associative tag system
                                      consciousness itself
          - slip-scale virtuality  {
                                      use of language
          - the pull-string theory of transformational grammar
                                   random-stimulus motor learning
          - bouleumatic system  {
                                   bouleumatic accumulator
          - basic ratiocination by simple comparator.
     Unless there  are other  main developments  back in my notes, the above
list delineates the main areas in which I  have both  theorized and  come up
with promising results.


                                                                 11 AUG 1976









     When  a  slice  of  pulsed  perception  comes  in, it must go through a
comparator system and into a memory engram channel, although perhaps  not in
dependent sequence.
     THere is  some question as to whether the engram-channel is like slices
of the raw perception or contains only the analytic results of the compsyst.
How  does  an  Eidetiker  recall  a  whole scene?  Of course, either or both
methods could be tried empirically.
     THe purpose of running  the perception  data through  a compsyst  is to
analyze the slices and find similarities among slices.  At this point we are
returned to the first sentence of  the  work  from  three  days  ago, asking
whether a  fixed-position eye  mechanism adds  extra data.   Apparently, the
orientation of  an image  can be  fully specified  just by  reference to its
particular   analytic   configurations,   since,  after  all,  every  single
possibility of  configuration  is  represented.    However,  there  might be
advantages in a seven-point compsyst over a three-point compsyst because the
central element of the  seven-point compsyst  could be  used as  a reference
point  for  orientation.    Of  course,  the  "upper" point of a three-point
compsyst could also be used for a reference point, and further elements from
an array could be associated with it at finer compsyst levels.
     If an "upper" element of three has an outside significance, then it can
assume the same significance on the inside.
     Now, by what ways will the  compsyst establish  tags going  to specific
memory  engrams?    Offhand,  I  can  think  of  three causes for tags to be
assigned:
          - temporal succession of two slices
          - analytic similarity by compsyst
          - accompanying signal from other perception or ratiocination
            channel.
     It must  be remembered,  during this theorizing about a single, initial
compsyst, that the perception  channel probably  is a  large array  with one
central focus area.  Being large, the array will initially have many unitary
transmission elements which start out not being associated  into any pattern
(of orientation), but which probably would gradually be added on to whatever
order was created and radiated from the central focus.   And so,  the nearby
existence of additional "wires" has to be kept in mind.
     Of  the  above  causes  for  associative  tags ("soctags" perhaps), the
temporal succession one is probably the easiest to  imagine, and  it is also
easy  to  theorize  that  temporal  succession supplies a good causation for
letting a system self-organize.
     However, temporal succession is not  at  all  an  instance  of content-
analysis.    The  second  of  the  above causations, "analytic similarity by
compsyst," promises to be more interesting.
     We may have to re-establish the 1967 notion  of a  "consciousness area"
so as  to have  a putative mechanism which is at all interested in receiving
notice of the formation of mental associations.

                              Scratch-Leaf                  from 11 AUG 1976

     sight-system
     sound-system
     comparator system
     tag system
     memory engram channel
     motor memory system
     motor muscle system
     bouleumatic system
     random dynamics system (for random stimulus motor learning)
     motor/sensor exterior representation of self
     an environment

                              Scratch-Leaf                   from "AUG 1976"

     tagsyst
     parsyst

associative tag system
slip-scale virtuality

     - temporal succession
     - analytic similarity by compsyst
     - accompanying signal from other perception channel


                                                                8 March 1977

     Although we can  assume  limitless  features  in  our  designing  of an
artificially  intelligent   computer,  there   are  certain   minima  to  be
considered.
     First we can state that our units are switching-units.  Now, suppose we
want to establish what is the absolute minimum of hardware necessary for AI.
Well, we  don't  have  to  think  in  terms  of  transistors,  or integrated
circuits, or  ferrite cores,  or even  material weight.   The  nature of our
components is more logical  than physical.   But  the environmental universe
can also be considered to be logical.  Therefore the question can be stated:
Out of  a universe  consisting of  countless units  with logical properties,
minimally how many units must join together to form an AI capable of dealing
with the universe?
     Intelligence does such things  as  analyzing  generalities, recognizing
identities, and  solving problems.   Basically  it manipulates and processes
logical structures.  The things in the universe exist not as unique entities
but rather as structured aggregates of simpler entities.
     Idea:   I bet  you could have side-by-side scales where on one side you
would list progressively the number of  units in  universes and  then on the
other  side  the  minimal  numbers  of  units  necessary  to  constitute  an
intelligence capable of doing all possible intellectual operations  with the
contents  of  those  universes.    I  don't mean exotic operations, just the
typical ones.
     We would have to establish just what operations  the intellect  must be
capable of.


                                                                 12 JUL 1977

                         Organizing the Nolarbeit

     It  should  be  possible  now  to start making the research work accrue
along specific lines.  For instance, there are the following topics:
          - basic ratiocination
          - volition systems
          - robotics
          - specific psycho-organism projects.
     If the theoretical work accrues along specific lines, then it  won't be
so hard  to get back into the spirit and niveau of the work after periods of
absence.
     Record-keeping can become more organized.    The  following  system for
keeping track  of generated  documents is  pretty clear.   There should be a
master file in which are kept  dated copies  of all  documents in  the time-
order of their genesis.  Thus it should be possible to go through the master
file and read the serial history of all work on  the Nolarbeit,  even though
the serial entries of documents might present a jumble of work pertaining to
many different departments of the total program.  This master  file is meant
to  be  as  handy  and  useful  as  possible  for  the kind of reading which
stimulates new ideas, so therefore as much as possible of its verbal content
should be  type-written.  It will be proper to substitute in the master file
typewritten  copies  of  what   were   originally   hand-written  documents.
Handwritten papers  which become represented in the Nolarbeit master file by
typewritten copies should be collected  in  a  Nolarbeit  manuscript storage
file.
     The manuscript  storage file  can serve several purposes.  Basically it
is available for a  check if  any question  arises as  to the  accuracy of a
typewritten copy.   It  also serves  as one  more copy for insurance against
loss of the informational  content of  the work-documents.   Of  course, the
manuscript storage  file will  not be  a complete  history of the Nolarbeit,
because some documents are  originally  typewritten  and  they  therefore go
straight into the master file.
     The master file serves as a source of photocopies for other files.
     There should  be at  least one  master file insurance copy.  That is to
say, the  master-file  should  exist  in  duplicate  for  protection against
irretrievable loss of information through such things as fire or inadvertent
destruction.  Any additional number of  insurance copies  as desired  can be
made by photocopying the main master file.
     There  should  be  Nolarbeit  topical  files  made up of photocopies or
carbon copies of items kept in the master file.  It would be in  the topical
files where  the research  work would  accrue along specific lines.  An item
from the master file might be photocopied for  insertion into  more than one
place among the topical files.
     A  topical   index  of  the  master  file  should  be  maintained  with
informational documents referred to by their dates of genesis and/or titles.


Simplest-Artificial-Mind Project                                 13 JUL 1977

                              Introduction

     This evening  I've  been  reflecting  on  how  we  might  construct the
simplest possible  mental organism  to show that we have produced artificial
intelligence.  I want to record  some of  the ideas  so that  later they can
serve as a springboard for further thought.
     We  would  go  heavily  into  providing  a language capability for this
machine.  I propose that we would set  up a  semi-English language,  so that
the  human  experimenter  could  readily  understand  and  even think in the
language used by the machine.
     We could call  the  language  "Sax,"  from  Anglo-Saxon.    Words could
consist  of  not  more  than  one,  two,  or three letters.  We could set up
requirements for the use of vowels somewhat as in English.  For instance, we
could say that the middle letter of any three-letter word had to be a vowel,
or we could just say that each syllable had to  contain a  vowel.   The main
idea is  to preserve  a semblance to natural language.  For instance, "I TOK
SAX AND YU TOK SAX."
     The language Sax would be a  strict code  of unambiguous  letters.  The
processes of  the use of Sax would be strictly analogous to the use of human
speech.   Utterances would  be introduced  to the  machine electronically or
electromechanically.   The SAM (Simplest-Artificial-Mind) machine would have
the tabula rasa capability to perceive and remember and associate utterances
in  Sax.    In  other  words,  there would be a quasi-genetic memory channel
serving quasi-auditory purposes.
     The  SAM  machine  would  also  have  the  motor  capacity  to generate
utterances in  Sax.   Whenever it  made utterances in Sax, it would hear its
own utterances.
     The above establishments allow us now to state some possibilities.   We
could use  a random-activator  process for the SAM to gradually become aware
of its own ability to make "sounds."  It would accidentally make  sounds and
simultaneously perceive them.
     By learning  to make  its own  sounds, the SAM machine would be able to
set up bouleumatic accumulators  for the  purpose of  consciously making any
desired utterances in Sax.
     By virtuality,  the machine  would be able to think in the language Sax
and it would not matter that the machine were not  thinking internal sounds.
It would  think in perfectly liquid units of code.  The human agent might be
able to pronounce Sax aloud, if he wanted to.
     So far we have given a description of  how language  might work  in the
mental organism.   The language system as so envisioned is simple in that it
does not require actual  acoustic  equipment  to  deal  with  actual sounds,
although if  we keep  strictly to our analogies it should remain possible as
an option for future development to go into acoustic devices.   However, the
language system  is only  a part  of the  mental organism.  For the language
system even to function  at  all,  there  must  be  experiential interaction
between  the  SAM  machine  and  its environment, and meaningful information
content must find expression in the Sax language.  Here is where  it will be
important to deploy the Nommultic concept of the basic ratiocinative device.
     It may  be valuable to construct two SAM machines, so that there can be
the two machines, the human agent, and the  background environment.   If the
human agent  taught the  language Sax to the two machines, then perhaps they
could learn together in a machine society.


                                                                 23 AUG 1977

     It is easily obvious  that the  mature existence  and functioning  of a
highly intelligent  mind is  not dependent  on the variety or breadth of its
perception channels.  Certainly  a human  being can  think and  use language
even if  he becomes blind, deaf, and so on.  So obviously then the conscious
intelligence would be operating on the basis of memory and  of ratiocinative
processing equipment working along with memory.
     Wow, what if the ratiocinative processing were of a homogeneous nature,
so that the "depth" or "level" of intelligence would depend just upon a kind
of pyramidal  quantity-question as to how much processing equipment there is
available either to function at once upon large aggregates or  in a parallel
fashion?